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SPECIAL PROJECT
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND Kosovo

INTRODUCTION: SEEKING RECONCILIATION OF SELFDETERMINATION, TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, AND
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
LINDA A. MALONE*
The whirl of debate over the Kosovo crisis often made reference to the "competing" norms of self-determination and territorial integrity, of humanitarian intervention and prohibitions on
force except in self-defense. The Essays that follow grapple with
humanitarian intervention on its face and as applied, as constitutional law scholars would say. Professor Bartram Brown explores the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention as a norm of
international law against the difficult backdrop of its justification in the Kosovo crisis.' Professor Julie Mertus faces the monumental problems of unleashing the doctrine, struggling to find
its limitations on the application of force.2
The murky legal pedigree of humanitarian intervention is
muddled even more by the humanitarian causes on which the
intervention depends. The new world order seems to have a lovehate relationship with the concept of statehood: everyone wants
one but no one wants to be a part of the ones that already exist.
The demise of colonialism and apartheid have made the villains
and the victims more difficult to identify. We are left only with
those competing norms: the U.N. Charter's prohibition on the
use of force except as a last resort and in self-defense;' the pres* Marshall-Wythe Foundation Professor of Law, William and Mary School of
Law; LL.M., University of Illinois College of Law; J.D., 1978, Duke Law School;
B.A., 1975, Vassar College. Background research for this Introduction was sponsored
in part by the Fulbright/OSCE Regional Research Award granted the author in
1999.
1. See Bartram S. Brown, HumanitarianIntervention at a Crossroads, 41 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1683, 1697-1741 (2000).
2. See Julie Mertus, Reconsidering the Legality of Humanitarian Intervention:
Lessons from Kosovo, 41 WAM. & MARY L. REV. 1743, 1752-87 (2000).
3. See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para 4; id. art. 51.
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ervation of the territorial integrity of states;4 the exaltation of
peoples' right of self-determination in the U.N. Charter,5 the
international covenants,6 and myriad other human rights documents;7 the right of self-determination that encompasses the
right of a state to determine its own government, free of outside
interference; and the right of peoples to seek and receive support
in pursuit of their self-determination.
The pertinent question undertaken in this Special Project is
where does humanitarian intervention, or the use of force more
generally, fit into this convoluted puzzle of competing norms of
international law. If humanitarian intervention has no place in
this paradigm, it becomes even more suspect as a norm that has
survived the post-Charter prohibition on the individual or collective use of force outside of the context of self-defense.
Secession from a state is itself a confrontational act. It inevitably invites a counterresponse from the established state in
terms of force. The norms of international law that recognize the
territorial integrity of an established state and the use of force
by a state in self-defense are elevated to the status ofjus cogens.
Secession cannot be equated with self-determination. Otherwise,
international law would be encouraging provocation or use of
force under the umbrella of self-determination and yet be condemning the established state's likely, even inevitable, response
of self-preservation.
If there is any proposition that clearly emerges from the legal
regime of the U.N. Charter, it is that force is available only as a
last resort. 8 That proposition must apply equally to the seces4. See id. at art. 2, para. 7.
5. See id. at art. 1, para. 2.
6. See International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16,
1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19,
1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 171.
7. See, e.g., U.N. CHARTER arts. 1, 55, 73 76(b); Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, Dec. 10, 1948, arts. 1, 37, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., pt. I, at 71, U.N. Doc.
A1810 (1948); Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and
Peoples, Dec. 14, 1960, G.A. Res. 1514, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 66,
U.N. Doc. A14684 (1961); Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning
Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of
the United Nations, Oct. 24, 1970, G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp.
No. 28, at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1971).
8. See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para 4; id. art. 51.
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sionist movement and the established state or else the rules
inevitably will favor one side over the other and one right over
the other (self-determination versus territorial integrity) in their
authorization of the ultimate response. If there is any aspect of
self-determination that is clear and widely accepted, it is the
autonomy of the population of a state to determine that state's
government. They may choose that government through violence
or civil war and not violate international law, so long as the government they are determining is to govern over the established
state. When the force is directed toward secession, in contrast it
must be justified as a measure of last resort to ensure the selfdeterminationof a people.
Acceptance of these premises leads to a possible reconciliation
of the norms of self-determination for national minorities on the
one hand, and preservation of territorial integrity on the other.
Individual human rights apply to all of the individuals within a
state. The more these rights are denied, the greater the denial
may be of the collective right of self-determination that the population of a state as an entity is free to choose its own government, even by force. If the denial of individual human rights
disproportionately affects or targets a national minority, or infringes protected rights for an ethnic, religious, or linguistic minority under Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights9 or protected rights of an indigenous group,
the minority's group rights as well as their individual rights are
being denied.
That does not necessarily mean, however, that the minority is
being denied its right of self-determination separate and apart
from the right of the population of the established state to
choose the state's government. The population of the state as a
whole is given the right to determine the government, even through
the use of force, at any time and under any circumstances. The
national minority or targeted group does not have the right to
choose its own government for the state, and certainly not
through the use of force. Only when the denial of individual or
group rights, or both, is so severe that the targeted "people" can9. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, art.
27, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 179.
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not "freely determine their political status and freely pursue
their economic, social and cultural development"10 does a separate and distinct violation of the right of self-determination
exist. Then and only then would force be available to effectuate
self-determination, because, by definition, political processes and
the mechanisms of civil society are not available to them to
rectify the situation. If even force cannot bring about the changes
necessary for the people to seek freely these two ends within the
established state, then secession is the method of last resort.
This paradigm suggests some necessary limits on humanitarian
intervention if the doctrine is to be recognized. Whatever the debate over the legitimacy of the doctrine, there is agreement that,
as with any unilateral or collective use of force by states, the
force must be necessary and proportional. As long as the derelict
state's structures allow for the oppressed people to seek an adequate remedy for their oppression through peaceful means, there
is no violation of the people's right of self-determination, justifying their resort to force. If the victims themselves have no justification to resort to force, certainly the individual or collective
states should not be permitted to do so under the auspices of
"humanitarian intervention."
The proposed paradigm can be summarized as follows. In the
exercise of self-determination, the population of an established
state may choose its own government, even through force. Any
subgroups or "peoples" of that population may resort to force
only when the state's denial of their individual or group rights, or
both, is tantamount to a denial of their right of self-determination,
that is, their right "to freely determine their own political status
and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development, and peaceful means are unavailable or ineffective."" If
self-determination cannot be effectuated within the established
state, then secession may be necessary as a last resort. Humanitarian intervention by a state or group of states is justified only
when a "people" is being deprived of its right of self-determination under circumstances that warrant use of force. Intervention
is not justified whenever the population of a state is entitled to

10. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 1.

11. Id.
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use force to choose the government, as that would in fact violate
the U.N. Charter's prohibition on intervention in the internal
affairs of a state and violate that aspect of self-determination.
The paradigm is tested, as every international rule of law
seems to be, by the Kosovo situation, but it withstands the challenge. Viewing the definition of "established state" from the
perspective most favorable to the alleged transgressor state,
Kosovo would be part of the established state of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslovia. The population of the state of Yugoslovia
is free to overthrow Milosevic whenever it chooses to do so,
through force or otherwise, but no outside state could intervene
simply to overthrow his government. The Albanian majority in
Kosovo could support that overthrow, with force in the case of a
state-wide civil war, or through other nonforcible means. If deprivation of their rights as a group within Yugoslovia were so
infringed by Milosevic's measures that they were denied their
right to pursue their economic, social, and cultural rights or
determine their political status, and peaceful means proved
ineffective or unavailable, then the Albanians were entitled to
resort to force against the Milosevic government. As a legitimate
self-determination movement, other states would be free to support them, even through force, under the rubric of humanitarian
intervention. If reconciliation sufficient to guarantee their right
to self-determination turns out to be impossible within the established state, then secession would be a solution of last resort
rather than a matter of right.
A few other examples suggest how the model could be utilized.
As the death penalty becomes more widely outlawed, the imposition of death sentences become increasingly suspect as a violation of international law. The unlawful taking of life is the most
grave of human rights violations, and statistics on its disproportionate use against African Americans in the United States are compelling. 12 Yet, use of the death penalty in the United States
would not in and of itself justify the use of force by the dispropor-

12. See, e.g., Evan Tsen Lee & Ashutosh Bhagwat, The McCleskey Puzzle: Remedying ProsecutorialDiscriminationAgainst Black Victims in Capital Sentencing, 1998
SuP. CT. REV. 145, 161-70; Symposium, The Capital Jury Project, 70 IND. L.J. 1033
(1995).
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tionately impacted racial group or justify humanitarian intervention by other states so long as the racial group was not being
denied its right of self-determination within the established
state and had available to it meaningful mechanisms to challenge the death penalty. Similarly, widespread use of torture itself
would not be grounds for humanitarian intervention unless the
intent or the effect of the torture was to suppress the right of the
population to choose its own government or the right of a state
subgroup or "people" to exercise its right of self-determination.
This proposal does not address whether humanitarian intervention itself is lawful, or the limits on its exercise. As noted
above, these issues are left to the distinguished scholars in their
commentaries that follow. 1 3 It does suggest, however, that there
may be a suitable place for humanitarian intervention in the
global legal framework that complements, rather than undermines, the accepted norms of international law.

13. See Brown, supra note 1, at 1697-1741; Mertus, supra note 2, at 1752-87.

